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PERMEABLE SOVEREIGNTY
AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

Paul Horwitz *
ABNER

S.

GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY

IN A LBERAL DEMOCRACY

2012. Pp. 333. Hardcover, $49.95.

INTRODUCTION

With Against Obligation,' Abner Greene 2 has accomplished a valuable task: he has
written a book that is both timeless and timely. It is timeless insofar as the main questions asked by his book-whether citizens have a general moral duty to obey the law,
and whether legal interpreters "have a duty to follow prior or higher sources of constitutional meaning"3-are perennial, and perennially fresh, questions in legal and constitutional theory.' It is timely because one of the main contributions of the book-its focus
on what Greene calls "permeable sovereignty," and particularly its application of that
concept to questions of law's treatment of religious obligations-is a central part of contemporary developments in church-state law and scholarship. 5
* Gordon Rosen Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. Thanks to Abner Greene for reading
and commenting on an earlier draft, and to Matthew Bailey for research assistance.
1. ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY (2012) [hereinafter GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION].
2. Leonard F. Manning Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
3. See, e.g., GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 1-2.

4. I would be remiss if I did not note another recent and excellent book that focuses on roughly the same
questions: LAURENCE CLAUS, LAW'S EVOLUTION AND HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (2012).
5. In church-state law, Greene's discussion of permeable sovereignty is highly relevant to recent cases

involving the ministerial exception, see Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.
Ct. 694 (2012), and the "contraceptive mandate." See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F. 3d
1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S.

Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). In
church-state scholarship, Greene's book is relevant to recent discussions of institutional religious freedom
and/or "freedom of the church." See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013) [hereinafter HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS]; Frederick Mark Gedicks, Narrative Pluralism and Doctrinal
Incoherence in Hosanna-Tabor, 64 MERCER L. REV. 405 (2013); Jed Glickstein, Note, Should the Ministerial
Exception Apply to Functions, Not Persons?, 122 YALE L.J. 1964 (2013); Michael A. Helfand, Religion's
Footnote Four. Church Autonomy as Arbitration, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1891 (2013); Paul Horwitz, Defending
(Religious) Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 1049 (2013) [hereinafter Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institu-

tionalism]; Paul Horwitz, Rethinking the Law, Not Abandoning It. A Comment on "OverlappingJurisdictions,"
4 FAULKNER L. REV. 351 (2013) [hereinafter Horwitz, Rethinking the Law]; John Infranca, Institutional Free
Exercise and Religious Land Use, 34 CARDozo L. REV. 1693 (2013); Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartz-

man, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917 (2013); Symposium, Freedom of the Church in the
Modern Age, J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES (forthcoming). Those are just a few examples, from the past year
alone, of the explosion in this area of church-state scholarship. To this very incomplete list I would add, at a
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The combination of timeless and timely topics is not always seamlessly achieved. 6
Even if Greene himself sees the book as a unity, readers and reviews may end up focusing more on one aspect of Greene's book than on others. That is an occupational hazard
for one who writes, as Greene has done, such a sweeping book, using the general concept
of obligation to cover a wide range of issues, from the fundamental jurisprudential question whether there is a general duty of political obedience,7 to the problems with history 8
and precedent9 as authoritative interpretive sources. The scope of his achievement deserves to be recognized and praised.
Nevertheless, I too will focus on just a sliver of his book: chapter two of Against
Obligation, which focuses on the relationship between "permeable sovereignty" and
church-state law.' 0 Greene is kind enough to give those of us with a narrower focus an
out, writing that one may accept his account of permeable sovereignty even if one rejects
his foundational chapter against legal obligation." I am not so sure that the two are
wholly separable.1 2 But the challenge is great enough, and Greene's discussion rich
enough, even given this limited focus.
Greene's discussion of permeable sovereignty, and his treatment in chapter two of
its application to religious exemptions from generally applicable law, comes at a useful
time. Religion Clause litigation, in a very real if crude sense, and law and religion scholarship, in a deep if vague way, have focused with increasing intensity on the contest between state authority and other authorities, especially religious ones. 13 This moment represents a return-perhaps a recurring return' 4 -of a broader debate over precisely how
pluralist and how authoritative our legal order is. Do the state and its laws set the entire
terms of engagement, accommodating other obligations (if at all) only as a matter of
grace or forbearance?' 5 Or are there other authorities out there, other obligations that
must and not may be given real weight, other "groups" with a "real existence that the

minimum, older and newer pieces by scholars such as Richard Garnett, Steven D. Smith, Zoe Robinson, James
Nelson, Jessie Hill, Caroline Mala Corbin, Kathleen Brady, Michael McConnell, Douglas Laycock, Leslie
Griffin, and others.
6. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Political and Constitutional Obligation, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1257, 1258
(2013) ("Greene is not as clear as he might be about the relationship between these two claims.").
7.

GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at ch. 1.

8. Id. at ch. 3.
9. Id. at ch. 4.
10. For a review with a similar focus, albeit from a very different perspective, see Linda C. McClain,

Against Agnosticism: Why the Liberal State Isn't Just One (Authority) Among Many, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1319
(2013). It may help underscore the difference in our perspectives that my recent book on law and religion focuses on agnosticism, see THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2011) [hereinafter
HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE], and that one working title for the book was Constitutional Agnosticism. For
another, no doubt better, recent book emphasizing agnosticism in its own way, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN,
DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013).

11.
12.
(2013)
13.

GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 33-34.
See generally Micah Schwartzman, Obligation, Anarchy, and Exemption, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 93
(reviewing GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1).
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

14. See Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutionalism, supra note 5, at 1049-50.
15. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV.
1159, 1160 (2013) (describing a "state-conferred-dispensation view," which asserts "the priority and supremacy of the state" and grants religious freedom as a matter of "beneficence," and charging that it "is the dominant
view today.").
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state recognizes but does not create?"' 6 If so, how do we set the just terms of engagement and co-existence between them-and just who is the "we" that will do so?
The reasons for the return and heightened intensity of this debate are varied and interesting. As its recurring nature suggests, some of the debate has to do with a broader
and perhaps endless movement back and forth of the pendulum. On this view, first public
and then private ordering dominate the conversation; as each side dominates in turn, it
gives birth to renewed resistance and a revival of interest in the opposing position. Some
of it may have to do with the phenomenon of polarization and culture wars,1 7 in which
each side seeks mastery of the levers of power and worries that the other side is gaining
an undue advantage.'" And some of it has afaute de mieux quality. Employment Division

v. Smith' 9 is still the law of the land. Many strong supporters of Free Exercise rights (although not Greene himself) 20 have become increasingly reconciled to it. 2' Despite the existence of statutory exceptions to that regime, 22 and the potential ease with which judges
can get around it, 23 Smith continues to cast a long shadow over free exercise law and theory, forcing those who champion broad religious liberty rights to find other avenues of
circumscribing state authority over religion. These and other factors have combined to
put the enduring contest between state and religious authority at the top of the judicial
and scholarly agenda in this area.
Greene's discussion of permeable sovereignty, and his attempt to cash out that

16. Jacob T. Levy, From Liberal Constitutionalism to Pluralism, in MODERN PLURALISM: ANGLO-

AMERICAN DEBATES SINCE 1880, at 33 (Mark Bevir ed., 2012). See also Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword:
Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 91 (1953):
The heart of the pluralistic thesis is the conviction that government must recognize that it
is not the sole possessor of sovereignty, and that private groups within the community are
entitled to lead their own free lives and exercise within the area of their competence an
authority so effective as to justify labeling it a sovereign authority.
17. See, e.g., HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE, supra note 10, at 136-42; Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism,
and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407 (2011).
18. Thus, one side sees the state as having expanded its regulatory reach so much that there is little room
left for a rich sphere of private conduct, conscience, and obligation. Exemptions or resistance thus become ever
more necessary. See, eg., Thomas v. Rev. Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 721-22 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Ronald
J. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 24 (2013); Richard W. Garnett, Pluralism, Dialogue, and Freedom: Professor Robert Rodes and the Church-State Nexus, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 503, 521
(2006-2007); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23-24 (1985). The
other side worries that claims for legislative or judicial exemptions from law have become an ever more powerful and dangerous vehicle which "elevates religious entities to a far higher ground than everyone else." Marsha

B. Freeman, What's Religion Got to Do With It? Virtually Nothing: Hosanna-Taborand the Unbridled Power
of the Ministerial Exemption, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 133, 147 (2013); see also Dahlia Lithwick, Conscience Creep: What's So Wrong with Conscience Clauses?, SLATE (Oct. 3,
2013),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and politics/juisprudence/2013/10/is there-a principled way to respon
d to the proliferation of conscience.html (describing conscience clauses in legislation as a potential "vehicle
by which we are going to end-run the most fundamental aspects of the social welfare state.").
19. Emp't Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that neutral, generally
applicable laws give rise to no serious claim to a judicial mandated exemption under the Free Exercise Clause).
20. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 116. Nor me. See HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE, Su-

pra note 10, at 184-90.
21. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Political (and Other) Safeguards of Religious Freedom, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 1815 (2011).

22. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1993); Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-1 (2000).
23. See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Smith in Theory and Practice, 32 CARDozo L. REV. 2055, 2056 (2011)
("[M] any judges find they have all the room they need to carve out needed exemptions for religious practitioners despite the principal rule of Smith.").
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concept in church-state law, is a valuable contribution to this discussion. As it stands,
that discussion suffers from one major shortcoming, one that is admittedly chronic in
much constitutional scholarship. Some of the scholarship is beautifully theorized; but the
theory is not always brought to the level of doctrine. Some of it is doctrinally sophisticated, but sufficiently lacking in theory that it is difficult to determine what all the doctrine-chopping is for, let alone to identify a metric by which it can be evaluated. It is to
Greene's great credit that he makes a serious effort to do both things, and does them
well. Theorists and doctrinalists alike will have to reckon with this book.
That said, one may wonder if Greene succeeds fully at either task-or, just as important, at linking the two enterprises. A popular metaphor in Religion Clause jurisprudence is that of the "play in the joints." 24 It refers to the interplay between the Religion
Clauses. But the metaphor, slightly adapted, applies as well to the connection between
the theory of religious freedom and the jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses. A good
deal of stress is borne by the linkage or joint between the two, and more often than not
this is the most vulnerable point.25
In the case of Greene's admirable book, the weakness strikes me as afflicting two
"joints" or linkages: 1) the linkage between his general discussion of permeable sovereignty and his broad argument with respect to the shape of religious liberty; and 2) the
linkage between his approach to religious liberty and specific cases. I worry in both cases
that Greene has offered a fairly attractive theory, and a fairly attractive (if problematic)
jurisprudential approach, but has not adequately tied the two together.
Other writers have taken on the religious liberty aspects of Greene's work at the
broader level of theory, 26 and at least one writer has quarreled with the kinds of outcomes that his approach to religious liberty entails. 27 If I have something to add here, it
is that I come as a friend. I am broadly sympathetic to his account of permeable sovereignty, and his argument that it has important implications for Religion Clause jurisprudence. 28 Although I quarrel with some of his jurisprudential approach-particularly his
insistence that the Establishment Clause "invalidat[es] legislation based in express, predominant religious justification" 29-I have every reason to want his project to succeed.
In this case, it may be that friendship entails stabbing Greene in the front and not the
24. It originates in Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). For more recent
usages, see, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718-19 (2004).

25. I do not exempt myself. Whatever virtues The Agnostic Age may have, I agree with those critics who
have said that it is most vulnerable to uncertainty or attack at the point of implementation of its general theory
or approach in specific cases. See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, We Hold Which Truths?, COMMONWEAL 29, Sept.
23, 2011. That this problem is widespread and may be inevitable in church-state law and theory is cold comfort. See, e.g., HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE, supra note 10, at ch. 8; MARC 0. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY

OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2013) (describing the law and theory of religious freedom as suffering from the problem of tragic choices). And, although they are justly subject to criticism, there are examples of writers in this
field who have done a careful and detailed job of both articulating a theory and applying it to a body of cases.
Two commendable examples are CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007), and KOPPELMAN, supra note 10.

26. See, e.g., Schwartzman, supra note 12; Seidman, supra note 6.
27. See McClain, supra note 10 (worrying, in particular, about how Greene's argument for a broad freedom
for nomic communities will affect children). Seidman, supra note 6, also questions some details of Greene's
religious liberty approach.
28. See, e.g., HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 5; Horwitz, Defending (Religious)

Institutionalism,supra note 5; Horwitz, Rethinking the Law, supra note 5.
29. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 155.
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back, so to speak.
I have few answers. I will not present a competing theory or implementing approach here; indeed, as I said, in many respects I sympathize with Greene's approach.
Nevertheless, I have a lot of questions. Some are broad; some are narrow and may come
close to nit-picking. But nit-picking may be a genuine contribution here, if I am right
about the gap between high-level theory and on-the-ground doctrinal practice that afflicts
most unified theories of Religion Clause jurisprudence, including Greene's. After laying
the ground by summarizing Greene's key arguments, I offer a volley of questions, which
involve both his theory of permeable sovereignty and his specific approach to Religion
Clause cases, as well as the joints between the two.
I close with a broader question. I wonder whether Greene does not err in describing his doctrinal application of the permeable sovereignty approach as a matter of "releasing people from the grip of the law." 30 Putting things in those terms may cede too
much ground to those who see state sovereignty as plenary, and give them the rhetorical
high ground from which to insist that exemptions are a way of putting religious claimants "above" or "outside" the law. 3 1 Whether from within the permeable sovereignty perspective or otherwise, we might better view these conflicts as a matter of renegotiating
the law to include some recognition of permeable sovereignty and religious commitments, rather than as a demand by religious and other nomic groups to stand outside the
law altogether.32
I.
A.

GREENE'S PERMEABLE SOVEREIGNTY APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

Permeable Sovereignty

The modern liberal state, Greene writes, claims a status of plenary sovereignty. "It
claims the legitimate power to demand general legal compliance. It might recognize exceptions for various reasons, but it is within the state's discretion to so recognize." 3 3 This
view is summed up dramatically in a statement by Emile Combes, a turn-of-the-century
French prime minister: "There are, there can be no rights except the right of the State,
and there [is], and there can be no other authority than the authority of the Republic." 34 It
30. Id. at 149. In correspondence with me, Professor Greene has suggested that I may elide two points here.
In his description, any accommodations of religious obligations would themselves be "within the law," while

the religious norms themselves would fall outside "the norms of the state's law." Email from Abner Greene to
Paul Horwitz, Oct. 18, 2013 (on file with author). I think the clarification is a useful one and thank him for
providing it, although I think my broader point here expressing concern about being too quick to cede the language of "the law" to one side of the argument still has some value.
31. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law?: The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption
From Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007); Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of HosannaTabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 984 (2013) ("[T]he numerous justifications for the [ministerial] exception are all a
restatement of one foundational and fundamentally mistaken argument: that religious groups are entitled to
disobey the law."); Horwitz, Rethinking the Law, supra note 5, at 353 (quoting a draft paper by John Witte describing advocates of Shari'a law as "hav[ing] given up on the state and its capacity to reform its laws of sexuality, marriage, and family life" and "want[ing] to become a law unto themselves.").
32. See generally Horwitz, Rethinking the Law, supra note 5.
33. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 20.
34. J.N. Figgis, The Great Leviathan, in THE PLURALIST THEORY OF THE STATE: SELECTED WRITINGS OF
G.D.H. COLE, J.N. FIGGIS, AND H.J. LASKI 112 (Paul Q. Hirst ed., 1989) (quoting French Prime Minister, Emi-

le Combes). See also Richard W. Garnett, Religious Freedom, Church Autonomy, and Constitutionalism, 57
DRAKE L. REV. 901, 902 (2009); Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutionalism,supra note 5, at 1049.
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is rarely so bluntly stated, but the view that all power lies within the boundaries of the
sovereign state, and that any constraints on that power-whether constitutionally mandated or provided as a matter of political grace-depend wholly on the structure of state
power is common enough.
In Greene's view, "viewing state sovereignty as plenary is a wish, a hope, an illusion, and we should dispense with it." 3 5 Instead, we should view our social and legal order as one of "permeable sovereignty." "Many of us adhere to norms other than the
state's laws." 36 Those sources of norms include "religion, philosophy, family, ethnic and
cultural groups, and more," although Greene's primary focus is on religion .37 We should
not view those norms as subordinate to the state's own vision, or their authority as subordinate to that of the state. Rather, "we should see sovereignty as permeable through to
our plural sources of obligation, rather than as absolute in the state and its laws." 3 8
Greene's account of permeable sovereignty is both descriptive and normative. Descriptively, it is consistent with the "complex set of sources of normative authority to
which many people turn" as a matter of actual practice.39 It also comports on a local level with the American constitutional structure, at the heart of which lies a "core commitment to multiple repositories of power." 40 On this view, the state should be understood
as just one of many potential sources of authority, and "the state's law [should] be understood as just one source of the norms that properly govern people's lives." 4 ' We should
42
thus "see the state's sovereignty as permeable-full of holes, rather than full."
Normatively, Greene argues that permeable sovereignty offers an attractive understanding of our political structure. It draws on a substantial literature of pluralism and
multiculturalism. 43 It advances a suitably humble, anti-foundationalist "agnosticism of
value that helps explain much of our constitutional order." 4 4 And by recognizing the
multiple sources of authority that compete for our attention and allegiance, and the interpretive and political responsibilities that reside in each individual citizen, rather than in
any single sovereign entity, "we increase our chances of being active, rather than passive, citizens."45 We prevent the alienation of power "from its true source-the people,
46
as citizens.
Taking permeable sovereignty as "a baseline," 47 as a reminder "that authority ultimately rests elsewhere than in the state," 48 has many implications for Greene, most of
which are beyond the scope of this review. It helps ground his central argument, in the
first part of his book, that "there is no successful general case for a presumptive . . . mor35. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 115.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 24.
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al duty to obey the law," although such an obligation may attach in particular cases. 4 9 it
supports his argument against an "interpretive obligation to prior sources of constitutional meaning," such as "original understanding or meaning or the teachings of precedent,"
insofar as interpretive authority, like sovereignty, is "permeable rather than plenary,
permeable through to different interpreters (other than the [Supreme] Court) and sources
of interpretation (other than the past)." 0 It also directs, or purports to direct, his account
of religious liberty, to which I now turn.
B.

Religious Liberty

Speaking very roughly, the modern American legal regime of religious liberty can
be viewed as falling into two major periods. The first period began in 1963, when the
Supreme Court issued its decision in Sherbert v. Verner."' During that period, the legal
rule was that the Free Exercise Clause requires a presumptive right to an exemption or
accommodation from laws that burden religious liberty, whether those laws are aimed at
religion or not.5 2
The second period commenced in 1990 with the issuance of the Supreme Court's
decision in Smith.5 3 In Smith, the Court held that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general
applicability." 5 4 In other words, mere incidental burdens on religion do not give rise to a
presumptive, judicially granted exemption from general laws. In practice, both because
of legislation" and case law,5 6 Smith's impact is not as broad as its early critics feared it
would be. In theory, however, the two tests are strikingly different with respect to their
starting points and default rules, even if the two regimes were not always radically different in application.
Put simply, Greene would enlist permeable sovereignty to take us back to the first
period, the Sherbert era-or what he believes that period should have been. Government,
he writes, "should seek to assist those who find themselves in a dilemma of competing
claims of sovereignty, from state and other sources." 57 Those living under competing
claims in a system of permeable sovereignty ought to have some partial "exit options" to
help them avoid "the clutches of the state." Judges and legislators should therefore
provide "exemptions for the free exercise of religion . . . as a matter of constitutional

right." 5 9
Such a right, he makes clear, "is prima facie only, subject to override by a compel49. Id. at 2; see generally id. at 35-113.
50. Id. at 162-63; see generally id. at 161-251.
51. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
52. The rule was, however, applied very weakly. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a
Crossroads,59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 127-28 (1992).
53. Emp't Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
54. Id. at 879 (quotations and citation omitted).
55. See e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act,
supra note 22. Many states have similar legislation.
56. See, e.g., Tebbe, supra note 23; Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise:
Smith, Lukumi, and the GeneralApplicability Requirement, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850 (2001).
57. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 114.

58. Id. at 115-16.
59. Id. at 116.
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ling state interest."60 That is what Sherbert required. But Greene would make the application of that test more demanding. Given the weakness of the state's claim to legitimacy
and the importance of other claims of authority, when addressing such claims,
"[g]overnment has to earn its stripes, law by law or case by case." 6' He is highly skeptical of governmental claims that uniformity is a compelling state interest, and argues that
we should hesitate before accepting "paternalistic justifications for the application of law
to religious and other deeply held, normative views." 62
This is a strong rule, and Greene cabins it in other ways. In particular, and against
the current of the cases, he argues that courts could inquire into whether a claim for an
exemption involves "a central religious or other practice." 63 He makes clear, as I noted,
that the right is still only prima facie, and allows for "case-by-case judicial balancing."6
And he recognizes the difficult choices involved in dealing with arguments for exemptions by illiberal groups, which may present strong competing equality claims. 65 But this
is still a very strong default rule in favor of religious exemptions 66-rightly so, in
Greene's view, given the weakness of the state's claim of plenary sovereignty and of a
concomitant general duty to obey the law.
This approach is both strengthened and necessitated, according to Greene, by a
special feature of the Religion Clauses: the balance they strike between disabling and
protecting religion in the political process. 67 The Religion Clauses, he writes, "should be
understood as striking a political balance, offsetting a gag rule with exemptions." 68
The Establishment Clause's "gag rule" requires the invalidation of any law that is
"based in express, predominant religious justification." 69 Put more positively, "For a law
to be upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge, the law's predominant express

60. Id. at 123.
61. Id. at 124.
62. Id. at 118. For present purposes, I deal only with "religious" exemptions, leaving aside questions of
whether other strongly held beliefs or sources of authority should be entitled to equal treatment. Much of
Greene's argument is limited to religion, although he acknowledges the broader question and sketches some
arguments in favor of extending exemption rights across all manner of claims. Id. at 116. Jay Wexler addresses
this point more directly elsewhere. Jay Wexler, Some Thoughts on the First Amendment's Religion Clause and
Abner Greene's Against Obligation, with Reference to Patton Oswalt's Character "Paul From Staten Island"
in the Film Big Fan, 93 B.U. L. REv. 1363 (2013). This has been an important question in law and religion
scholarship of late. See, especially, Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CI. L. REV.
1351 (2012).
63. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 130; see, e.g., Emp't Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or.

v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (rejecting a centrality test); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,
485 U.S. 439, 457-58 (1988) (pre-Smith case rejecting centrality inquiry); Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin:
The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 958-59 (1989) (enumerating problems with centrality).
64. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 131, 156.

65. Id. at 157-60.
66. With respect to illiberal groups in particular, although he recognizes that some of their exemption
claims should fail, his approach is "deferential to (even illiberal) persons/groups desiring to depart from law
and live by their own lights." Id. at 157. I generally share Greene's perspective here. For criticisms of this approach for failing to give appropriate weight to equality concerns and neglecting to give full consideration to
the case of children, see McClain, supra note 10.
67. See Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993). In
Against Obligation, Greene argues that the political balance argument for exemptions "fits with my theme but
could be considered a stand-alone argument." GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 149.
68. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 150.

69. Id. at 155.
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purpose must be secular, and any expressly religious purpose for the law must be ancillary and not itself predominant."7 0 Legislators and voters are entitled to rely on their religious beliefs "when they form political positions or decide how to vote." 7 ' But an argument in favor of a law that is stated in predominantly religious terms "effectively
excludes those who don't share the relevant religious faith from meaningful participation
in the political process." 7 2 "Reference to human experience can be seen as the common
denominator for political debate."7 3 Conversely, "[w]hen religious believers enact laws
for the express purpose of advancing norms dictated by their religion, they exclude nonbelievers from meaningful participation in political discourse and from meaningful access to the source of normative authority predicating law."74
Free Exercise exemptions are a corollary to the Establishment Clause gag rule.
"[D]enial of a right of political participation is sufficient to undermine political obligation and to strip the state of its claim of legitimacy."75 Exemptions are thus required, "to
compensate religious people for the obstacle [the gag rule] poses to their participation in
the democratic process." 7 6 Religious faith is simultaneously a forbidden ground for lawmaking and "a ground for avoiding the obligations of law."77
II.

QUESTIONS

POSED BY GREENE'S APPROACH

Despite, or perhaps because of, my general sympathy for Greene's permeable sovereignty approach to religious liberty, I am left with a number of questions about both its
justification and its implementation.
A.

Questions of Connection Between Theory and Practice

I find much to appreciate in the broad picture Greene draws of permeable sovereignty. Anyone who has written with admiration of both pluralism and agnosticism,7 8
and advocated an understanding of our social and legal order in which non-state institutions play a key role,7 9 is bound to find something attractive about a theory that "is based
in keeping front and center agnosticism of value and its manifestation in the political setting, permeable sovereignty"; that rejects a vision of state power as plenary and conceives of the Constitution as "anti-foundationalist" and focused on "multiple repositories
of power;" that gives pride of place to "doubt" and "the centrifugal"; and that "start[s]
from the outside in, rather than from the inside out, and begin[s] with a presumption that
various comprehensive views, not just our own, might be correct." 0 This approach is not
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 152.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 150.
Id.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 155.
Id.
Id.

78. See, e.g., HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE, supra note 10; Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutional-

ism, supra note 5; Paul Horwitz, Churches as FirstAmendment Institutions: Of Spheres and Sovereignty, 44
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79 (2009).
79. See generally HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 5.
80. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 20, 22, 121, 126. On the latter point, see HORWITZ,
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entirely reassuring for a lawyer. It may drive the rule-bound to distraction. There is a
good deal of virtue in settlement. But there is also reason to reject "the lure of ruleness," 8 ' and to appreciate a constitutional vision that cabins power by diffusing it rather
than attempting, with uncertain success at best, to enthrone the state (let alone the court)
and expect it to lay down clear rules for its exercise of power.
That said, it is sometimes unclear how Greene's broader vision of permeable sovereignty relates to on-the-ground implementation. Greene assures us that "one could
adopt [his] argument for permeable sovereignty" even if one rejects his argument that
"the state's political legitimacy" is correlative with "a citizen's moral duty to obey the
law."8 2 His discussion of religious liberty acknowledges that permeable sovereignty
might, as his language in the book generally suggests, require "a constitutional right to
judicial exemptions for nonreligious norms," with all the questions that entails, 83 but sets
that issue to one side.84 He argues that his account of the symbiotic nature of the Religion Clauses, with Establishment Clause gag rules balanced by Free Exercise exemptions, is consistent with his larger vision of permeable sovereignty, but "could be considered a stand-alone argument: one could reject it and accept the foregoing case for state
recognition of permeable sovereignty; conversely, one could accept it while rejecting all
or pieces of the foregoing." 8 5
Greene presents all this as a feature of Against Obligation, which allows us to accept or reject particular pieces of his argument without worrying about the rest. Readers
might view it as a bug. In the piece of the book we are concerned with here, dealing with
religious liberty, it becomes difficult to tell what independent work permeable sovereignty does in requiring or guiding his prescriptions for the Religion Clauses. That matters, I
think, because it affects the weight of the arguments in favor of (or against) adopting the
balancing approach Greene recommends. If that approach is not required by permeable
sovereignty, then why not opt for clear (albeit imperfect) rules, laid down authoritatively
by the Court, over judicial balancing, with all the "[h]ard[ ] cases" that will require resolution under that uncertain standard?86 Conversely, Greene argues that one could accept
the principle of permeable sovereignty while rejecting his approach to the Religion
Clauses.8 7 If that is the case, then again we must ask where and how strong the linkage is
between his theory and his recommended practice.
In some places, the linkage seems especially weak. Recall, for example, that in order to avoid the concerns about endless exemptions that produced the rule in Smith,

FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 5, at 16, 72-74 (arguing that law should be understood in a bot-

tom-up fashion in which a variety of spheres and institutions participate, along with lawmakers, in building
legal rules and norms).
81. Abner S. Greene, What is Constitutional Obligation?, 93 B.U. L. REv. 1239, 1249 (2013).
82.

GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 5, 33.

83. See Wexler, supra note 62.
84. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 116, 149.

85. Id. at 149.
86. Id. at 158. The indeterminacy of that test is nicely captured by Greene in one description (one that I
agree with in broad terms, incidentally): "[W]e can seek a nuanced approach to relaxing the demands of the
state, to allowing religious and philosophical and other sources of normative authority to govern the lives of the
state's subjects to the fullest extent compatible with the stable operation of government and the liberty of other
persons." Id. at 115. A world of uncertainty occupies the last seventeen words of that sentence.
87. Id. at 149.
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Greene suggests that courts could ask whether particular religious burdens are "obligatory or central" to those claimants' faiths.8 " Greene anticipates the objection that questions
such as centrality will entangle courts in religious questions they ought not decide. His
answer to this concern is that "if parties don't want such judicial questioning, then they
don't have to ask for an exemption. Waiver here seems a sensible posture."8 His answer
may be sensible. But it's hard to see how such an answer, which treats fundamental religious claims and questions as easily defeasible, follows from or is even consistent with
permeable sovereignty. 90
In short, Greene may make an attractive case for permeable sovereignty, and he
may make an attractive case for his particular vision of religious liberty. But I am not
convinced that he makes as strong a case for a relationship between the two. As I noted
earlier, this seems to be a common problem in law and religion scholarship, which is often most vulnerable at the point where theory becomes practice. But it is a problem for
Greene as well.
B.

Questions of Implementation

Every theory of religious liberty is bound to face difficult questions of implementation, at least if its author is forthright enough to attempt to provide practical guidance.91
Greene does an admirable job of detailing the practice of religious liberty under his approach. But his discussion raises many questions. I approach them primarily first through
the structure of the balancing test Greene proposes, and then add some questions on top
of that, roughly following the order of his chapter. I ask these questions; for better or
worse, I do not answer them.
Begin with one of the threshold requirements of Greene's exemption-friendly balancing approach. Under that approach, "the citizen should first make her case for how
she is burdened.

. .

. This makes sense because we want to screen out citizen claims

based on either insubstantial hits to serious interests or any kind of hit to an interest not
part of one's deeper set of values." 92 Again, this sounds sensible enough. But how do we
distinguish between substantial and insubstantial "hits?" As I noted earlier, 93 this distinction appears to be intended to ward off the concerns about endless exemptions that ended

88. Id. at 131.
89. Id. at 132.
90. Nor, for that matter, am I entirely convinced that his entire "political balance" argument, which as far as
I know predated his writings on permeable sovereignty, has much to do with permeable sovereignty in the final
analysis. I relegate this point to a footnote for two reasons. First, I may be biased here: I share his interest in
permeable sovereignty but have always resisted his argument for an Establishment Clause gag rule. Second,
there is at least a plausible connection in the book between his account of permeable sovereignty and his gag
rule argument. But the connection still seems fragile to me. It is true that Free Exercise exemptions might
"ameliorate the legitimacy/obligation problem caused by the gag rule." Id. at 157. But I am not convinced that
the gag rule itself is a necessary consequence of permeable sovereignty.
91. Some writers attempt to avoid these problems by focusing on doctrine while bracketing or ignoring
questions of theory. The attempt fails. Church-state doctrinalism without any theory either begs all the questions of theory it seeks to avoid, or accepts as a given whatever theory can be said to animate the jurisprudence.
In either case, it cannot escape questions of theory, and the failure to engage those questions leaves it without
any resources to answer them.
92. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 118-19.

93. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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up ushering in Smith. 94 But Smith happened for a reason. Drawing these sorts of distinctions is indeed difficult.
Consider another key aspect of Greene's test: "Government has to earn its stripes,
law by law or case by case." 95 This appears to relate to both his underlying argument for
permeable sovereignty, and his desire to ensure that government does not simply win
every case by claiming an interest in uniform application of the law.96 But what does it
mean to say that government must prove itself "law by law or case by case?" Won't government (and courts) learn from experience? As it learns, won't case-by-case balancing
end up ushering in more categorical rules? 97 And given the cost-sharing and riskspreading nature of many modern social welfare regimes, is Greene right to say that "a
mere desire for uniformity [should] (almost) never suffice as a compelling state interest"? 98
More generally, Greene argues that "we should not be troubled by case-by-case judicial balancing" because it is "a familiar task" for common-law-oriented constitutional
courts, and he cites as an example the free speech cases involving time, place, and manner. 99 This seems too sunny a view. It is not as clear to me that courts actually do time,
place, and manner tests well, or that they do not end up substantially favoring the state or
the majority."oo Similarly, he praises Martha Nussbaum for seeking to guard against "the
slippery nature of public order and safety claims" made by the state by emphasizing that
"'the threat to stability [posed by a religious liberty] must be extremely evident, in terms
of a manifest breach of civil peace, if there is to be any legitimacy to state infringe-

94. Another reason to doubt this will succeed is that even if courts stem the flood by evaluating substantiality and centrality up front, we are still left with the ruling in Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981),
which treats highly idiosyncratic individual religious claimants' as sincere, and thus allows a proliferation of
valid claims of centrality and substantiality based on individual religious views. Shoring up the dike at one
point will not prevent it from collapsing at others.
95. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 124.

96. Id. at 118. It also relates to a standard question in the case law: whether the compelling interest test
should be applied only with narrow reference to the specific case before the court, or whether it should weigh
in the balance all the possible exemptions to the challenged law that might arise. Compare Gonzalez v. 0 Centra Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430-32 (2006) (holding that RFRA requires a "focused inquiry" in which government must show that its compelling interest requires "application of the challenged law
'to. . .' the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened"), with United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1982) (rejecting an exemption under the Free Exercise Clause because "it
would be difficult to accommodate the comprehensive social security system with myriad exceptions flowing
from a wide variety of religious beliefs.").
97. See generally Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 803 (2005).
98. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 118. For example, Greene questions the result in Unit-

ed States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), which refused to grant an exemption to the Social Security tax payment
system for an Amish employer of Amish workers, arguing that it presented "less than compelling state interests." GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 123. But a court informed by experience, and by
knowledge of the Social Security system, might well have concluded that some benefits regimes-an increasing number of them, in fact-depend on uniformity to work. How broadly Lee applies will likely be a major
issue in the Supreme Court's treatment of the contraceptive mandate cases, which it is about to hear as of the
time of this writing.
99. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 131-32.

100. For a mixed review, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in
FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 783 (2007). See also Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 604-05 (1993) (arguing that time, place, and manner doctrine ends up
favoring majoritarian preferences).
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ment.""'o That sounds a lot like the free speech cases dealing with incitement of lawless
activity. Those cases erect a strong bulwark against prosecution. 102 But they are not
wholly indicative of the main body of free speech law, which is full of categorical distinctions, regularly accused of incoherence, and in some areas has ended up by ushering
in a Smith-like approach that favors rules of general applicability. 103
In short, the "stepped-up judicial scrutiny" Greene recommends raises a lot of
practical questions.104 If this approach, whatever its problems, is compelled by the argument from permeable sovereignty, then so be it; but, as I have said, it's not clear how
strong the linkage between the two is. In any event, but especially if it is treated independently of permeable sovereignty, Greene's approach leaves open questions about how
it will be implemented and whether that implementation will succeed. o Indeed, it is
precisely these questions of implementation that arguably led us to Smith.
I have similar questions about Greene's advocacy of a political balancing approach
to the Religion Clauses, and specifically his argument for an Establishment Clause gag
rule. Space limitations prevent me from going into them in great detail, and in any event
they have been raised elsewhere.106 I agree with those critics who argue that expressly
religious arguments are neither as inaccessible to others as Greene claims, nor are they
any more inaccessible than other arguments, even ostensibly "secular" ones. 107 That
seems especially true to me in the current age, a "secular age"' 08 or "agnostic age"109 in
which many people live cheek by jowl with others who hold different religious beliefs or
non-beliefs, and in which both non-belief and many forms of religious belief are at least
imaginable to many of us." 0 I would just add a few other points.
First and most important, I think Greene is mistaken as a matter of the best reading
of the Establishment Clause to focus on the deliberative process of lawmaking rather

101.

GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 125 (quoting MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF

CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 63 (2008)).

102. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

103. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
104. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 143.
105. The best evidence that it will not, of course, is the Sherbert era itself, which did not usher in the results
Greene seeks. Id. at 123-24.

106. For criticisms, see, e.g., Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 763 (1993); Scott C. Idleman, Ideology as Interpretation:A Reply to Professor Greene's Theory of the Religion Clauses, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 337; Scott C. Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and the Establishment Clause, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2002); Michael W. McConnell, Five
Reasons to Reject the Claim That Religious Arguments Should be Excluded From Democratic Deliberation,
1999 UTAH L. REv. 639 (addressing the sorts of arguments made by Greene); Steven S. Shiffrin, Religion and
Democracy, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1631 (1999). For a reply to one critic, see Abner S. Greene, Is Religion
Special?: A Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 535. See also HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE,

supra note 10, at 258-60, 266-71 (arguing for a broadly permissive rule for religion in public discourse); Paul
Horwitz, Religion and American Politics: Three Views of the Cathedral, 39 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 973 (2009).
107. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 106, at 651-54; Shiffrin, supra note 106, at 1638-39; Larry Alexander,
Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763, 769-70, 774-75 (1993).
108. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (2007).
109. HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE, supra note 10.

110. See id. at 112-21. Of course, my own description may be too sunny. If so, however, Greene shares some
of my optimism, since he concedes that "the nonreligious can debate religious arguments" and that many religious arguments are "based in human reason and experience." GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at
154.
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than the result-on the inputs rather than the outputs of lawmaking."' The Establishment Clause, on this view, bars certain legislative outcomes that effectively require the
state to announce conclusions on questions of religious truth. But it does not bar legislative outcomes that merely depend on lawmakers' views of religious truth, no matter how
explicitly they relied on those views. I agree with Greene in favoring an exemption regime under the Free Exercise Clause, but I do not share his Establishment Clause-based
reasons for favoring such a regime.
Second, I doubt the problem is great enough to warrant such a gag rule. Given both
the state of American religious pluralism and the background legal rule that accommodations and other laws cannot improperly favor particular denominations,112 there are plenty of reasons (apart from their own inclinations to do so, which will generally suffice) for
lawmakers to voluntarily offer a suite of both religious and non-religious arguments for
laws. Third, on a related point, Greene's argument for a gag rule is, he says, "nation- and
practice-specific."11 3 And our culture is religiously and politically pluralistic. For that
and other reasons, most lawmakers rely on a mixture of religious and non-religious reasons in support of the laws they seek to pass. Given those factors, I do not think our experience justifies Greene's gag rule, at least as long as the Establishment Clause is treated as maintaining a limitation on particular legislative outputs.
Finally, Greene argues that his rule is acceptable because, while some laws will
pass and others won't, his approach "will eliminate the Establishment Clause injury of
excluding nonbelievers from meaningful participation in the political process."" 4 Maybe
so. But it may result in the opposite problem: the injury of excluding some believers
from meaningful participation in the political process. Moreover, that burden will fall
unequally. Most mainstream believers already make both "secular" and "religious" arguments in public debate as a matter of course. The citizens most greatly affected by
Greene's gag rule will be those with comprehensive, fiercely held religious beliefs.
That should concern anyone, like Greene, who is convinced of the value of pluralism and the importance of multiple sovereigns, but still hopes for some level of coexistence in our social order. Greene already acknowledges the strain that illiberal groups put
on his or any other legal and social regime. "' He might consider the risk that an up-front
gag rule will drive more individuals and groups into the arms of illiberalism, and an outright rejection of peaceful coexistence. 116 As long as we have certain Establishment
Clause limitations on legislative outputs, it is better, in my view, to keep such individuals
as part of the conversation, however difficult that conversation may be, than to risk driving them further away.

111. See, e.g., HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE, supra note 10, at 258-62, 270. Andrew Koppelman takes a
similar view. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 10, at 94; Andrew Koppelman, SecularPurpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87,
89 (2002).
112. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
113. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 155.

114. Id. at 152.
115. Id. at 157.
116.

See LUCAS SWAINE, THE LIBERAL CONSCIENCE: POLITICS AND PRINCIPLE IN A WORLD OF RELIGIOUS

PLURALISM (2008); see also HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE, supra note 10, at 205-08.
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CONCLUSION: A QUESTION ABOUT "LAW"

The questions I have asked so far are critical and skeptical. They are not, I noted,
unique to Greene's approach; they can be asked of just about any legal implementation
of a theory of religious liberty. But they are important in evaluating Greene's work too.
That these questions remain is hardly a fatal criticism. Against Obligation is an important, provocative, and timely book.
Let me close with a question that is unlikely to occur to most of Greene's critics,
who are likely to be skeptical about permeable sovereignty and loyal to the liberal state.
The question is whether Greene does not, in one respect, cede too much ground to his
critics and their worldview.
Greene's permeable sovereignty approach, we have seen, treats "all of our sources
of value, of how to live, as at least presumptively on par with each other, as equal."117
"The state's law," on this view, "should . . . be understood as just one source of the
norms that properly govern people's lives."" Despite this, Greene's language ends up
stacking the deck in favor of the state, or at least of a particular view of law, by treating
other nomic communities and sources of norms as not being part of "the law." Thus, he
speaks in terms of judicial exemptions for religious claimants as "releasing [them] from
the grip of the law," frames the case for exemptions as an "exit" remedy, and talks about
exemptions as "providing a balm against the otherwise scorching demands of the
law."119

All this is understandable enough, and perhaps not too much hangs on the language
here. But I wonder whether it does not give away too much ground. Arguments for permeable sovereignty, or institutional autonomy, or the importance of nomic authority, or
simply for accommodation of individual claimants under the Free Exercise Clause, are
not just arguments for "exceptions" from "the law." They are, in large measure, arguments about what "the law" itself requires, and about what it encompasses.
As I have written elsewhere, "In thinking about 'what the law is,' we need notand perhaps ought not-think solely in terms of the positive law of the state." 120 Religious and other nomic communities are indeed independent sources of authority. But
they are also a part of "[o]ur constitutional order," which embraces "multiple repositories
of power."121 When we defer to agency interpretations of statutes, 122 we do not speak in
terms of those agencies being "outside the law." Rather, we treat them as part of the law,
as partners in developing its unfolding meaning. I worry that treating Free Exercise exemptions as an "exit" or "escape" from "the law" constitutes a pre-emptive surrender of
rhetorical ground to those who insist that legal uniformity itself is a clear, powerful, and
sufficient value. Rather, we might think and speak of permeable sovereignty as involving
an insistence that religious and other nomic communities, with the substantial authority
they enjoy within their proper sphere, form an essential part of our social order-of our
117. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 2 (emphasis added).

118. Id. at4.
119. Id. at 10, 115, 149.
120. Horwitz, Rethinking the Law, supra note 5, at 363 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177
(1803)).
121.

GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 1, at 3.

122. See Chevron U.A.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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"law," properly understood and interpreted. Through the Religion Clauses, that includes
our positive law. They are inside the law as well as outside it.

